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MARKETS, ELITES, AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY IN THE INTERNET AGE 
Gregory P. Nowell 
DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE 
SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 
2016). PP. 312. HARDCOVER $29.95. 
 
MARK R. PATTERSON, ANTITRUST LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY: GOOGLE, YELP, 
LIBOR, AND THE CONTROL OF INFORMATION (HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2017). PP. 336. HARDCOVER $45.00. 
Ideally, these two books would portray two intertwined elements of world political 
economy: Patterson’s would provide a detailed introduction to the thorny issues around 
antitrust law and the control of information. Kennedy’s would provide a portrait of how 
international elites vie for the power and influence to shape outcomes in these and other 
domains. Patterson’s book delivers; Kennedy’s book disappoints, so the pairing is not as 
synergistic as one might wish. 
Kennedy’s World of Struggle1 addresses a long, well-established social science 
topic: elites in the world order; the unsurprising thesis is that there is a great deal of conflict 
among international elites. In another time, a personal memoir of a career dealing with 
important people and important issues would meaningfully contribute to our 
understanding of global politics. But this is an effort to turn personal ruminations into 
social science. Kennedy’s work does not situate itself against other studies of elites in 
politics, and it neither offers nor refutes a clear thesis (an example of a clear thesis about 
elites is Robert Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy”2). 
Nor do we get case studies that would give flesh to the generalities. Kennedy seems 
ready to tip in this direction in Chapter 4: he proposes three case studies of “expert 
communities.” The three cases are (1) Public international lawyers in the U.S. after World 
War II; (2) Human rights advocates in the West after 1980; and (3) “Specialists in 
development policy who draw on legal and economic materials,” the time period 
                                                          
 1. DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016). 
 2. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1911). 
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unspecified.3 However, if you think you are going to get the names of public international 
lawyers and their important cases after World War II, you are in for a disappointment. 
There is no chapter on human rights advocates, nor is there a chapter on development 
economics and its controversies, by which I mean, a chapter that shows patterns of elite 
argumentation on something identifiable, whether the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade or the desirability of hydroelectric projects in Brazil and Egypt. Kennedy’s apparent 
goal is to say that within specialties there emerge patterns of argument that are 
generalizable across all cases; he refers to “a grammar of arguments.”4 But this book 
shows no evidence of how to create such case studies or how case studies are used as the 
basis for broader generalizations. Figure 5-4 offers a scintilla of promise; in this table about 
development experts, Kennedy cites clusters of well-known economists in one column, 
and then associates them with clusters of policy objectives, policy instruments, and legal 
expertise.5 If Kennedy had produced similar tables for “public international lawyers” and 
“human rights advocates,” and most importantly, fleshed out the table summary with a 
chapter of historical and textual analysis showing real people fighting over real cases, we 
would have a book that at its best could be intriguing and brilliant; and at its worst, it would 
be very useful, because the case studies would serve those interested in learning about the 
three areas. 
The book, unfortunately, is also essentially bereft of methodology. Kennedy briefly 
discusses his techniques: “My own next step has usually been to spend time with these 
people, observing their modes of work, listening to their style of argument, and reading 
the materials they produce.”6 However, we never find out who “these people” are: not by 
name, not by country, not by income, not by rank or position or types of organizations that 
employ them, nor how many. We never find out what materials “they” produced, because 
these materials are never cited; nor are we offered textual excerpts from the different 
materials that would empirically demonstrate a similar grammar of argument across the 
three specialties. In short, this book about international elites does not define ‘elites’ in 
general, nor does it name the elites it purportedly studies; nor does it examine whether 
there is a difference between international elites and national elites. 
And the more’s the pity. Since global elites are an important topic, let me name a 
few studies that at least provide a spectrum of methodologies and perspectives. At the level 
of concrete case studies of international elites, let me mention Keck and Sikkink on 
transnational movements7 or Haas on epistemic communities.8 These are solid empirical 
works that advance our understanding of the international arena and elites. At the level of 
elite studies that have essentially become classics of political theory, there is of course 
                                                          
 3. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 120. 
 4. Id. at 144.  
 5. Id. at 142, fig.5-4. 
 6. Id. at 124. 
 7. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).  
 8. PETER M. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION (1990). 
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Michels’ Political Parties9 and Mosca’s The Ruling Class.10 And of course Mills’ The 
Power Elite11 offers a sociology of power and how it affects ideology and decision 
making. Mosca, Michels, and Mills may not be specifically “global” theorists but they 
certainly offer models of how to approach today’s Davos global elites. I mention last Van 
der Pijl’s The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class,12 which seems to me the most on point: 
here we have a study of an evolving pattern of contested transnational governance, that is 
to say, the elites are in conflict, which is among Kennedy’s concerns. Since Kennedy 
makes no reference to antecedent studies of elites and how he seeks to extend or refute 
their ideas, A World of Struggle becomes a mish-mosh with no compelling theoretical 
statement and no compelling empirical cases; it amounts to a very unmemorable read. 
By contrast, Patterson’s Antitrust Law in the New Economy is smart, useful, 
frustrating, informative, and worrisome.13 If you are a lawyer or a professor interested in 
antitrust cases, this is a book to get—it will be a valuable resource and is worth every 
penny. It advances detailed analysis of specific cases and legal opinions related to 
information technology. The author carefully walks through cases, analogies, and 
precedents. To the non-lawyer these same virtues can be hard to push through, and the 
disciplined focus on legal principles becomes frustrating and worrisome. There is a vast 
technological transformation of human civilization that oozes in and around this legal 
narrative, and the worries come from the non-legal implications that are woven around 
Patterson’s analyses. 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or on some contrivance to 
raise prices.”14 Smith’s Wealth of Nations posits the notion that a conspiracy against the 
public—as opposed to a natural condition in which prices are set—is the bedrock conceit 
of antitrust theory, whether as articulated by Smith in 1776 or today. 
That is, the notion of antitrust is co-existent with the development of capitalism. 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations is not just about how capitalism works, but how it evolved 
against feudalism. The trade restrictions of avaricious lords held back the development of 
a capitalist economy: their grasping reach curtailed the development of wealth in general. 
The long feudal stagnation was overthrown by an alliance of monarchies with slowly 
developing capitalist interests in the towns. The good news was that the aristocracy’s 
influence over the economy was decreased. The bad news is that the restriction of that 
power led to very tight networks between capitalist interests and the state. Market 
privileges were doled out to the favored few; those not so favored were placed at a distinct 
competitive disadvantage. Cartel pricing, and the use of political power for the market 
benefit of one at the expense of another, were the norm. That is mercantilism. The only 
way to stop mercantile regulation, said Smith, was through legislative intervention; he 
imagined that a virtuous parliamentary landed gentry would legally enforce competitive 
                                                          
 9. MICHELS, supra note 2. 
 10. GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS (Hannah Kahn trans., 1939). 
 11. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956). 
 12. KEES VAN DER PIJL, THE MAKING OF AN ATLANTIC RULING CLASS (1984). 
 13. MARK R. PATTERSON, ANTITRUST LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY: GOOGLE, YELP, LIBOR, AND THE 
CONTROL OF INFORMATION (2017). 
 14. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 117 (Dutton and Co. 1910) (1776). 
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norms.15 These arguments about Smith are laid out very well in McNally’s Political 
Economy and the Rise of Capitalism.16 
Weighed against history, free competition is an artificial construct, an ideological 
position, if you will, of those excluded from protected economic privileges against those 
who have them. And it has always been this way. So the “natural state” of capitalism is 
collusion, cartels, and discriminatory regulation. Therefore, part of the history of antitrust 
law is how the natural state of collusion manages to reproduce itself in the legal system 
designed to control it. As an example, Patterson discusses reverse payments in the drug 
industry, where pharmaceutical producers pay other potential producers not to infringe on 
their monopolistic market.17 The complexity of antitrust theory is that it is, first of all, 
precedent based and thus dips into almost every aspect of business endeavor for analogies. 
But the other level of complexity is that it is very hard to master the precedent-based cases 
and at the same time keep in view the notion of preserving fair competition, as well as the 
public interest, given that the two are not always the same. 
Patterson’s search for relevant legal precedent becomes a review of the history of 
technology and market power struggles among firms for the last 100 years or so. Reading 
them, it is hard not to yearn for simpler days, when oil companies colluded in their domain, 
and steel companies in theirs. But our private lives were our own. No matter whether 
today’s information technology practices are adjudged competitive or anti-competitive, 
their scale and reach are stupendous. One wishes their actions could be merely a 
“conspiracy against the public.” 
The market rigging behind the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) is a classic 
insider price rigging scheme where the technical complexity helps shield participants from 
discovery.18 Railroads and oil companies once jiggered their prices through the basing 
point system; the bankers discovered they could manipulate LIBOR. That such 
manipulation requires information is true enough; but it is true in the sense that people 
who know what they are doing in an industry are always best positioned to craft desired 
outcomes. The discussion of LIBOR does not take us too far afield from the analyses we 
might find in mid-twentieth century classics such as Hexner’s International Cartels19 
(which is very rich on patent law) and Machlup’s Political Economy of Monopoly20 (which 
raises the possibility that patents should be done away with entirely). The discussion of 
Yelp is interesting but not critical; Yelp is really a minor player on today’s internet. The 
exploration of Google’s monopoly travails, however, opens up many interesting themes. 
Patterson expands upon Rubinfeld and Maness’s idea of a “patent thicket” which the 
large corporations buy up—bundles of tens of thousands of patents, which they can deploy 
against competitors.21 Neither the owners of the patent bundles nor the competitors under 
                                                          
 15. Id. at ch. 13. 
 16. DAVID MCNALLY, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A REINTERPRETATION (1988). 
 17. PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 187. 
 18. Id. at 92–93. 
 19. ERWIN HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (1946). 
 20. FRITZ MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY (1952). 
 21. PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 200; DANIEL L. RUBINFELD & ROBERT MANESS, The Strategic Use of 
Patents: Implications for Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 89–
91 (Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005). 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 53 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss2/24
NOWELL, BOOK REVIEW_FINAL (335) (CORRECTED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2018  10:29 AM 
2018 MARKETS, ELITES, AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 339 
legal threat actually know what is in these bundles. The relevance and theoretical 
violations of these patents have to be litigated, and if one litigation effort fails, the patent 
bundle owners reaches into its bundle and begins anew an infringement suit, indefinitely. 
Companies like Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Apple, etc., have ample litigation funds to 
make competitors see the light about paying a licensing fee. The legal system that is 
supposed to guarantee “due process” and maintain competition becomes, instead, a 
weapon of market control. 
In this book, the nominal focus on the title cases leads inevitably to related cases, 
such as Microsoft’s patents.22 At the simplest level for Google, one that has been the object 
of ongoing litigation, is the order in which it displays search results. Corporations that pay 
Google advertising fees rise higher in the hierarchy of returned search listings than those 
who do not, according to critics.23 This may be obvious, in the form of paid 
advertisements, but it may also arise in what appear to be nominally “objective” search 
results. 
Consider a search on a cooling fan for a desktop computer case. Doing a Google 
“All” search tends to direct one to various emporia (Newegg, Tiger Direct, Amazon) as 
well as stores (Walmart) and manufacturers (Corsair, Cougar, Cooler Master). One can do 
a Google “shopping” search and thousands of individual fans (many manufacturers and 
models) will be offered. Each individual fan will have a hierarchical listing of vendors, up 
to several dozen. Of these vendors, two or three are immediately put before the eye. For 
the rest you have to click through. Buyers’ ratings of the vendors, which are almost 
invariably big established firms, propel them to first place over the “Mom and Pop” EBay 
listings, which often have no ratings at all. 
But do these buyers’ ratings accrue to the big firms because name recognition drives 
business to them? Or do they accrue because Google, accepting payment, has arranged for 
these big firms to surface in conspicuous positions? That is hard to know. Are the 
algorithms inherently unfair? 
One might head for Amazon and skip Google. In Amazon, one is in a controlled 
marketplace which directs searches exclusively to vendors who are members. The Amazon 
emporium is so vast that search results for gadgets are almost as exhaustive as on Google. 
And Amazon has a number of tricks up its sleeve to get customers into their emporium: 
popular television shows that are only available to Amazon Prime members and Whole 
Foods discounts that are likewise only available to Amazon Prime members, to name just 
a couple. When you pay your $100 annual fee to Amazon for the “free shipping” offer that 
goes with it, you suddenly have an interest in making sure your next purchase is from 
Amazon. Keeping track of when you break even with money paid and money saved is a 
chore. It is easiest just to keep going back to Amazon to get maximum value from your 
membership. Once in the Amazon all-encompassing emporium, you might never want to 
go to EBay or do a Google search again. You may spend a lot less time with Netflix or 
HBO, and forsake as well the local supermarket. The immense diversification of Amazon’s 
activities is key to its market dominance: one might prefer to buy computer parts and 
electronics from Newegg or Tiger Direct, which are also (comparatively tiny) emporia, 
                                                          
 22. PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 201. 
 23. Id. at 79–80. 
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but neither Newegg nor Tiger Direct can offer, wrapped into an annual shipping charge, 
exclusive access to online entertainment and discounts at a store like Whole Foods. Even 
if these lesser emporia manage to sell a twenty dollar computer fan to you for a buck or 
two less, does it matter? 
Google’s alleged rank-ordering practices may be related, in some ways, to the 
single-market dominance of major urban newspapers in advertising before the internet 
era.24 Connections between older case law and current issues are Patterson’s strong point. 
But it is just a leaf on top of the flood: the relevance of antecedent caselaw in newspapers 
to Google’s advertising practices is important to the antitrust lawyer. Yet it is Craigslist, 
charging mainly for employment listings in only six American cities, that eviscerated the 
classified ads in all the nation’s newspapers. A core source of newspaper funding 
collapsed. If only we could go back to the good old days where every city had a thriving 
monopolistic newspaper! That system paid for good journalism, such as we see less and 
less. 
The ultimate monopolistic threats lie, it seems, less in market control than in 
amassing great hordes of data. Run-of-the-mill businesses like car companies and airlines 
are going to find themselves beholden to the information masters and what they charge to 
release their data. The amount of information gathered about us is not only greater than 
we imagine, it is greater than we can imagine. We-Vibe, a company that markets sexual 
toys, recently agreed to pay out $3.2 million in damages for using Bluetooth technology 
to gather live data, without prior notice or consent, from customers using their products.25 
Roomba’s cute vacuum robots are set to map users’ homes and sell the map data to such 
buyers as Amazon, Alphabet (Google), and Apple.26 Who could think these things up? 
Dynamic pricing is being coupled with behavioral psychology, and now it is not 
merchants conspiring to raise prices, but their computer programs. A real-time gasoline 
pricing tool marketed by a2i Systems in Holland, for example, received a complaint from 
a gasoline station owner that the program had not marked down his station’s prices in 
response to a sale at the station across the street. But the program was correct: it accurately 
determined that long waiting times at the bargain-priced station would discourage buyers 
and send many of them across the street where they would be willing to pay more. To take 
advantage of this anticipated influx, the computer program raised prices, all the while 
calculating the perfect margin that would allow the revenue from increased markup to 
exceed the revenue lost to decreased sales volume.27 Is this Smith’s “conspiracy against 
the public” or merely a fiendishly clever and altogether legal practice? The lower-priced 
competitor is right across the street. All you have to do is wait in line. The bottom line is, 
we do not have a chance. Our actions are not only surveilled, as in Orwell’s 1984, but our 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 118–27. 
 25. Alex Hern, Vibrator Maker Ordered to Pay Out C$4m for Tracking Users’ Sexual Activity, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/14/we-vibe-vibrator-tracking-users-sexual-
habits. 
 26. Alex Hern, Roomba Maker May Share Maps of Users’ Homes with Google, Amazon or Apple, GUARDIAN 
(July 25, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/25/roomba-maker-could-share-maps-users-
homes-google-amazon-apple-irobot-robot-vacuum. 
 27. Sam Schechner, Why Do Gas Station Prices Constantly Change?, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-do-gas-station-prices-constantly-change-blame-the-algorithm-1494262674. 
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reactions are anticipated by behavioral models. And it is all fully automated, too. 
The future promises to generate a lot of work for antitrust lawyers, and Patterson’s 
book is a major guide to complex terrain. But the downside of the book is that, while 
reading it, one becomes attuned to the vast implications of a wholly cybernetic society: 
not just the issues in the book, but those that are popping up every day in the news. Our 
prospects are not good, not just in terms of the chimerical search for a competitive market, 
but in terms of preserving elements of human identity that many of us grew up taking for 
granted. 
 
7
Nowell: Markets, Elites, and Information Technology in the Internet Age
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2017
